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Oil, Relative Strength and Civil War Mediation 
Govinda Clayton, Conflict Analysis Research Centre, University of Kent  
  
Abstract: Civil conflicts within oil-rich states tend to last longer but are less likely to 
be mediated and end in a peace agreement. This implies that oil-funded conflict is less 
likely to end through a mediated settlement despite offering a greater opportunity for 
peaceful resolution. This article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the research 
question: to what extent does the presence of non-lootable natural resources impact on 
the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? I argue that oil-wealth raises the 
relative capacity of the incumbent, making it more challenging for insurgents to force 
mediation and gain the guarantees against defection that are needed to resolve the 
problem of credible commitment. This theory is tested on 319 civil conflict episodes 
between 1946 and 2004. The results support the argument that non-lootable natural 
resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and outcome of mediation. 
The analysis also reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases 
relative to a states hydrocarbon revenue (per capita). This is an important contribution 
to conflict research focused on natural resources that has previously overlooked the 
relationship between resource wealth and civil conflict management efforts.  
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This article examines the influence that hydrocarbons have on third-party conflict 
management. Whilst many studies have explored the effect that natural resources 
have upon the onset and duration of civil war, relatively little academic research has 
investigated their impact on conflict resolution.1 In principle the longer duration of 
oil-funded war should offer a greater opportunity for conflict management (Lujala 
2010).2 Yet many of the most durable oil-funded conflicts have proved to be largely 
resistant to the entrance of intermediaries and often take longer to resolve once 
mediation has begun (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan, and Syria). This implies that oil-funded 
conflict is less likely to end through a mediated settlement despite offering a greater 
opportunity for peaceful resolution.  This article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the 
research question: to what extent does the presence of non-lootable natural resources 
impact on the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? 
I argue that hydrocarbons exacerbate bargaining problems by increasing the 
relative capacity of the incumbent. Petroleum offers a significant source of state 
revenue that raises the incumbentÕs capacity to resist insurgent demands. This reduces 
the frequency and effectiveness of mediation, as it is more challenging for relatively 
weak insurgents to generate the costs that are required to compel the government to 
accept an intermediary and gain the guarantees against government defection that are 
needed for a settlement (Clayton 2013; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009).  
To empirically assess this argument I use a Sartori selection model to analyse 
319 civil conflict episodes drawn from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). This dataset includes 1,531 conflict 
                                                
1 To my knowledge only one study partially explores the link between resources and conflict 
management, see Humphreys 2005.  
2  On average the presence of hydrocarbons within the zone of hostilities more than doubles the 
average duration of a civil conflict see, Lujala 2010. 
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years between 1946 and 2004, of which 236 involved mediation. Resource data 
indicating the spatial and temporal overlap of resources and conflict is used to 
statistically assess the different mechanisms through which hydrocarbons might 
impact mediation (Lujala, R¿d, and Thieme 2007). The results support the argument 
that non-lootable resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and 
outcome of mediation by raising the relative capacity of the incumbent. The analysis 
also reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a states 
hydrocarbon revenue (per capita).  
The manuscript is structured as follows: I first discuss the influence that the 
distribution of belligerent power has upon the onset and outcome of civil war 
mediation. I develop a theory and propositions linking non-lootable resources to 
relative belligerent power. Finally the method of empirical analysis is discussed and 
the statistical results presented.   
 
Relative Belligerent Strength and Civil War Mediation 
 
The Incentives for Mediation in Civil War 
Mediation is an extension of negotiation in which decision-making power 
remains with the disputants, but some aspects of the dialogue are controlled by a 
third-party (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). It incorporates a diverse collection of 
conflict management efforts, ranging from loosely facilitated bilateral negotiations 
(e.g. the Cuban facilitation of negotiations between FARC and the Colombian 
government) to closely managed and manipulated dialogue processes (e.g. The 
Dayton peace process).3 Mediated negotiation, in its various forms, is the primary 
                                                
3 Commitment problems born from the asymmetry in power and legitimacy mean strictly bilateral 
negotiation is extremely rare during civil conflict (Greig and Regan 2008; Svensson 2007; Walter 
2002;). This is not the case during inter-state conflict, in which the international recognition both 
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means through which civil war peace agreements are achieved (Greig and Regan 
2008; DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). 
Mediation is a voluntary process that hinges on a third party being willing to 
offer their services, and both belligerents being open to outside intervention. The 
asymmetry in power and legitimacy provides insurgents with greater incentives to 
enter into mediation (Clayton, 2013; Gent, 2011; Zartman 1995). For the rebels, the 
onset of a dialogue process increases legitimacy and elevates their political status in a 
manner that is unlikely to occur through military means alone (Melin and Svensson 
2009; Greig and Regan 2008).  The initiation of mediation also demonstrates rebels 
ability to force concessions from the state, and moves them closer to achieving their 
political demands. InsurgentÕs benefits come with relatively few costs, as mediation is 
non-binding, which means they can enter into a dialogue (and receive the associated 
rewards) with little fear of being compelled to accept an unfavourable deal.  
In contrast, the incumbent has fewer incentives to negotiate with insurgents. 
The government is likely to possess a larger military force, more substantial economic 
resources, and greater political legitimacy (Clayton, 2013; Gent, 2011). Accepting 
mediation signals the incumbentÕs inability to control their territory and undermines 
its autonomy.  This in turn can motivate new and existing challengers to mobilise and 
take up arms against the state. Mediation also requires the state to concede control of 
(at least) some elements of the peace process, increasing the probability of an 
unfavourable outcome. Together these significant costs act as strong disincentives for 
the incumbent to accept mediation.  
However, when military victory becomes increasingly unlikely for the 
government, and/or the costs of conflict become unbearable, mediation offers a 
                                                                                                                                      
belligerents, and less severe problems of commitment, make bilateral negotiation an effective and 
frequently adopted form of conflict management.  
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competent means to terminate violence (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Beardsley et 
al. 2006). The incumbent is only then likely to endure the costs of dialogue when a 
rebel group proves capable of presenting a significant challenge to state authority 
(Clayton 2013; Grieg and Regan 2008; Melin and Svensson 2009).  In this way the 
onset of mediation is largely determined by the incumbentsÕ cost-benefit analysis, in 
which the significant price of mediation is weighed against the benefits of conflict 
resolution.4 
The relative strength of the insurgents is a strong determinant of the stateÕs 
propensity for mediation. Strong rebels are better equipped to produce the high 
intensity and costly violence required to trigger dialogue. Strong insurgents are also 
those most likely to challenge core state interests, warrant a significant allocation of 
the governmentÕs military resources, and fundamentally threaten the survival of a 
regime. This has been illustrated empirically in studies showing the positive 
relationship between the likelihood of mediation and the strength and size of a rebel 
group (Clayton 2013). 
 
The Incentives for Settlement in Civil War 
Armed conflict produces significant costs that can be avoided in the absence 
of war (Fearon 1995). A settlement that removes the costs of conflict should be an 
optimum outcome for all disputants. However, belligerents have incentives to 
exaggerate their strength and resolve in order to elicit concessions from their 
opponent. This creates a problem of asymmetric information in which both parties 
question the credibility of the information provided by their adversary. This can 
                                                
4 In principle both the rebels and government have the power to veto the onset of mediation. However, 
given the significant rewards rebels are likely to be favourable to the onset of the non-binding process, 
even when they lack a genuine desire for peace. It is therefore the governmentÕs incentives that tend to 
determine when mediation occurs (Clayton 2013; Grieg and Regan 2008; Melin and Svensson 2009; 
Svensson 2007).  
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complicate the resolution process and lower the likelihood of the belligerents finding 
an acceptable solution (Kydd 2006; Svensson 2007).   
The problem of asymmetric information is compounded by the obstacles 
disputantsÕ face in credibly communicating their intention to abide by the terms of an 
agreement. When it is expected that incentives for cooperation will shift over time it 
is challenging for the potential benefactor to credibly guarantee they will not renege 
on a deal in the future (Walter 2002). In this way, future incentives to abandon a 
settlement can prevent resolution (Beardsley et al. 2006; Beardsley 2011). The 
problem of credible commitment is particularly pertinent within civil conflicts, as 
actors must reside in close proximity in the aftermath of an agreement. This can create 
a period of intense vulnerability for at least one actor, exacerbating the problem of 
commitment during the process of disarmament.5  
Mediators can reduce the bargaining challenges that commonly prevent 
resolution. By acting as a conduit of information, mediators can help the disputants 
gain a more accurate appreciation of the conflict, helping to reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information. Mediators can also to reduce the problem of commitment by 
offering incentives to counterbalance future benefits belligerents might have to renege 
(Beardsley 2011: 172). Inducements can include economic or political support and the 
provision of security guarantees in the most challenging post-settlement period. 
Mediation is more likely to secure an agreement when the capabilities of the 
belligerents are closely aligned. Relatively strong insurgents are less vulnerable in the 
event that the government defects from a deal, as they should retain the ability to 
protect their constituents in the early phases of the post-settlement period (Clayton 
2013). In comparison weak insurgent groups are more likely to become vulnerable in 
                                                
5 This also contributes to the rare nature of bilateral negotiations during civil violence, as the assistance 
of a third party is generally required to overcome the more challenging bargaining environment. 
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the aftermath of an agreement, and require strong security guarantees to protect 
against government defection. Yet paradoxically weak insurgents with the greatest 
need of protection are also the least likely to gain concessions on issues such as third-
party monitoring, security sector reform and power sharing (Gent 2011). Relatively 
weak insurgents lack the offensive capabilities to threaten an escalation in violence or 
other similar actions that might later be traded for commitment-enhancing 
concessions.  
Hence, while weak rebel groups have the greatest need for additional 
concessions to maximize their security, they are also the groups that are least likely to 
receive these concessions from the state. Mediators therefore have a more limited 
range of  tools available to them when working within conflicts that involve relatively 
weak insurgents. As such, mediation is less frequent and less effective under 
conditions of power disparity.  
 
Non-Lootable Natural Resources  
 
Mediation Onset 
Petroleum is the worldÕs largest industry. In 2009, $2.3 trillions worth of 
hydrocarbons were sold globally, representing around 14 percent of global 
commodity trade (Comtrade 2014). The high demand for petroleum means that oil 
extraction can be an extremely valuable source of state revenue. As a result, most oil-
producing states are relatively rich. For example, in 2004 the median income of oil 
producing states was more than double that of non-oil producers (Ross 2012: 158).  
Contrary to the claims made by earlier studies, there is little evidence that oil 
extraction produces slow economic growth or weak and ineffective governments 
(Ross 2012). However, oil rents are subject to less political scrutiny than other 
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sources of state revenue (e.g. taxes). This often hinders democratization and increases 
the likelihood of conflict. Lower political influence also makes it easier for 
incumbents that utilize oil revenue to insulate their regime from political opponents 
(Reno 1998; Le Billon 2001; Basedau and Lay 2009; Smith 2004). The 
disproportionate investment in the security forces is commonly justified by the need 
to protect oil producing infrastructure, or the desire to deter external opponents. Yet 
the sophisticated security apparatus supported by oil revenue can also be deployed to 
protect oil-funded regimes from internal challengers (Thies 2010; Morrison 2009). 
The strong military capacity of states like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Nigeria illustrate the 
scale of the military force that can be accumulated in this way.  
In principle rebels can also benefit from the sale of non-lootable resources. 
However, this requires a level of territorial control that is often unattainable for 
insurgent groups. On occasions in which groups do gain sufficient territorial control 
of an oil-rich region, it is also more challenging for them to convert non-lootable 
resources into revenue. Extracting and transporting hydrocarbons is a technical 
process that requires a combination of strong organisational structures, hierarchical 
leadership, and formalised links to international markets (Le Billion 2001, 2012).  
Consequently incumbentÕs legal trade in non-lootable commodities generates far 
greater revenue than insurgents could accumulate through the theft of oil (i.e. Ôoil 
ÔbunkeringÕ) or the sale of future oil contracts (i.e. Ôbooty futures) (Ross 2004; 
Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009; Humphreys 2005; Fearon 2005). This means that 
whilst insurgents might also profit from the sale of oil and gas, incumbents 
monopolise the resource revenue (Thies 2010). For example, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) generated the majority of their revenue 
from the sale and trade of oil that they looted from pipelines in the Delta area of 
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Nigeria. Yet even at its peak MEND was only capable of generating a small fraction 
of the oil wealth controlled by the Nigerian state. 
The stateÕs monopolisation of the oil industry can lead rebels to target oil and 
gas facilities, disrupting the production process, and leading to the evacuation of oil 
company employees (Mitchell and Thies 2012). In theory this should increase the 
incumbentÕs conflicts costs, and act as an incentive for the state to enter into 
mediation. However whilst the reduction in resource revenue is disruptive, the rebels 
are unlikely to fundamentally remove the stateÕs ability to profit from the resource.  
As such the state is unlikely to accept mediation as long as it can retain a level of 
production capacity that sustains a military advantage.  
The greater military capacity of oil producing states increases the power 
asymmetry in civil conflict. This makes it more challenging for a non-state group to 
pose a credible threat to a state supported by oil revenue, as the oil funded security 
services of rentier states are better equipped to resist the challenge posed by insurgent 
groups (Reno 1998; Le Billon 2001).  Rebels must therefore amass a stronger military 
force than would normally be required in order to trigger mediation. In addition to a 
better-funded armed force, resource revenue can also help incumbents to mitigate the 
financial costs of war. Oil rents can be used to counterbalance the conflict costs that 
often increase the likelihood of mediation (Greig and Regan 2008), effectively 
reducing the financial pressures of war and insulating the regime from need to seek 
peace.  
The on-going conflict in Iraq offers a pertinent example of these effects. Since 
2013 Islamic State (IS) has enjoyed a meteoric rise across the Middle East. The rapid 
growth of IS has been supported by the revenue raised from pillaged Iraqi oil, 
estimated to be worth as much as $1 million dollars a day (Financial Times 2014). 
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However, the Iraqi state has maintained an advantage over the insurgents despite the 
loss of oil rich territory. Selling oil on the black market means that IS offers its 
hydrocarbons at around 75% less than the market value (Newsweek 2014). At the 
same time Iraq has increased its oil output from other regions, to the extent that it has 
regained its position as the second largest oil producer in the world (Reuters 2014). 
Iraqi petroleum revenue, estimated to be approximately $100 billion a year (Reuters 
2014), has helped the government to maintain a strong military presence in most key 
positions, and remain equipped to endure the costs of the on-going war.  Thus despite 
the costs of fighting in a destructive civil conflict, the loss of key oil-producing 
territory and calls from political commentators to consider negotiation (e.g. Powell 
2014), the Iraqi government has shown no desire for international mediation. This 
illustrates the greater capacity of oil-rich states to withstand the costly price of civil 
conflict and continue to monopolise oil wealth in the face of well-armed and 
organised insurgent groups (Mitchell and Thies 2012). 
The case of IS also highlights how geo-political factors might impede the 
initiation of dialogue in oil-rich states. The strategic importance of petroleum on 
global markets creates incentives for external actors, in particular incumbent 
supporters, to protect their interests in a region (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000).6 
This could involve sanctions to prevent the onset of negotiations with hostile non-
state groups. For example, the United States is likely to strongly oppose any form of 
political dialogue between the Iraqi government and ISIS. Yet states that are capable 
of generating significant oil revenue, which are also those most likely to be of interest 
to international actors, can use oil revenue as a form of economic protection from the 
                                                
6 Rebel groups are also vulnerable to external pressures. However, links between rebels and their 
patrons are less formalised, meaning rebels are capable of shifting or redefining allegiances in order to 
achieve their political goals. Geopolitical pressure is therefore unlikely to be a serious impediment to 
rebels considering mediation.  
 
 11 
interests of outside parties. Put differently, oil wealth can purchase a certain level of 
freedom in domestic policy (e.g. Saudi Arabia). Thus if the incentives are sufficiently 
strong, wealthy oil producers should be capable of entering into dialogue with 
internationally unfavourable groups. Rather than geopolitical pressures, it is therefore 
the greater relative capacity of oil producers that reduces the likelihood of mediation.  
 
From the preceding discussion I derive two hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 1a: Mediation is less likely when a state contains non-lootable resources.  
Hypothesis 1b: The greater a stateÕs non-lootable resource revenue the lower the 
likelihood of mediation. 
 
Non-Lootable Resources and Mediation Outcome  
 
Oil revenue also lowers the probability of a mediated agreement. As the 
previous discussion illustrated, oil rich incumbents tend to enjoy a position of relative 
strength. This power asymmetry increases the vulnerability of insurgents in the post-
settlement period, creating a greater need for commitment enhancing mechanisms. 
Insurgents are unlikely to commit to disarmament without security guarantees, power 
sharing provisions, and/or political representation to ensure that their constituents 
receive any additional economic and social resources promised within a deal (e.g. a 
more equitable share of oil revenues). 
Reduced transparency within petroleum producing states further intensifies the 
commitment problem. Resource wealth lowers state reliance on taxation, which often 
results in corruption, patronage, nepotism and ineffective bureaucracies (Moore 2009; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Predatory 
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governments serving sectional interests are unlikely to desire a settlement that 
redistributes oil wealth more equally (Le Billion 2001: 567.), and are thus not likely 
to be trusted to implement an agreement without mechanisms to ensure compliance 
(Mitchell 2002).7  
Yet paradoxically insurgents operating within an oil-rich state are less likely to 
receive the concessions required to overcome the more significant commitment 
problems. Oil revenue increases states capacity to endure the costs of conflict, making 
it harder for insurgents to force concessions once within mediation. This reduces the 
likelihood of concessions on vital issues that might be offered to protect the 
insurgents against defection. Similarly, it is more challenging for a mediator to 
leverage an oil-producing state towards an agreement, as their greater economic 
strength means that they require more significant inducements than would normally 
be required to sweeten a deal (e.g. Angola). It is therefore harder for mediators to 
manufacture a zone of agreement and/or offer commitment-enhancing mechanisms.  
The valuable prize of oil wealth can also motivate insurgents to resist an 
agreement (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Prior to conflict, oil revenue can be used to to 
buy off threatening groups, which can often prevent the onset of violence (Fjelde 
2009). However, once within a conflict insurgents are more inclined to bargain 
harder, or fight longer, for a greater share of the resources.  
The Sudanese conflict offers a pertinent example of these mechanisms. 
Between 1955 and 2005 the Sudan Liberation Army and central Sudanese 
government engaged in two civil conflicts that lasted almost forty years and cost 
around two and a half million lives. In this time mediation repeatedly proved an 
                                                
7 Even when terms are agreed resource conflict are more likely to occur as a result of these 
distributional problems (Rustad and  Binningsb¿ 2012). 
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ineffective method of resolving the conflict. The first mediation process did not 
officially take place until a decade after the violence started, it then took a further 
thirty-six separate mediation episodes (spanning two decades) to eventually produce 
the 2004 agreement (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). In this time oil 
revenue insulated the state from the costs of war and sustained a closed autocratic 
system of rule. The secessionist aspirations of the SLA also complicated the process, 
with the insurgents consistently demanding greater control of the valuable oil wealth 
in their region.   
 
From this discussion I derive two further hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2a - Mediation is less likely to be successful when a state contains non-
lootable resources.  
Hypothesis 2b- The greater a stateÕs non-lootable resource revenue the lower the 






To test the hypothesis I draw upon the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011).8 This is the first dataset to provide 
information on all mediation attempts within conflict episodes at the lower 25 battle-
related death threshold.9 The CWM dataset includes information on 319 civil war 
                                                
8 For a full list of cases included within the CWM see, http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/ 
9 A conflict episode is a continuous period of active conflict-years. Episodes begin when the conflict 
first crosses the threshold provided in the UCDP/PRIO definition of conflict, and terminate when an 
active conflict year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than 25 battle-related deaths, see 
Kreutz, 2010. 
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episodes between 1946 and 2003, 236 of which included mediation. The CWM 
dataset defines mediation as: 
a process of conflict management where disputants seek the 
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, 
group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their 
differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of law (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991: 8.).  
This broad definition captures the full collection of conflict management efforts, from 
the most passive forms of facilitation to more active Ômediation with muscleÕ. To 
better account for the presence of multiple mediation attempts within a single conflict 
episode I separate each episode into individual years. This approach results in a 
population of 1,531 observations (civil conflict years).  
 
Model   
A disputantÕs decision to accept mediation is likely to be closely connected to 
their expectations of success. The forces shaping the onset of mediation are also likely 
to be the factors that determine the outcome of a process (Svensson 2007). When the 
two phases of mediation are modelled independently this crucial selection effect is 
overlooked. Existing studies of mediation have used varieties of a two-stage selection 
model to capture this effect (Svensson 2007; Melin 2011). However, selection models 
require firm identifying assumptions and the conventional Heckman model is only 
appropriate when at least one additional observable explanatory factor affects only the 
selection side of the model. It is challenging to identify good distinct predictors for 
initial mediation selection and the eventual outcome of mediation. In the absence of 
such features the Heckman model estimates are Ôbased only upon Éthe distributional 
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assumptions about the residuals rather than the variation in the explanatory variablesÕ 
(Sartori 2003:112) 
Instead I utilize SartoriÕs (2003) selection estimator. This model is based on 
the identifying assumption that the error term for the observations is the same in the 
selection and outcome equations. This model is appropriate when the unmeasured 
factors influencing both selection and outcome can be assumed to have the same sign 
or direction. This seems acceptable here, as existing mediation research suggests that 
the unobservable features that encourage an incumbent to accept mediation are also 
those features that increase the likelihood of success. For mediation is only likely to 
occur on those occasions in which the resolve of the state has been diminished. The 
reduction in (unobserved) resolve for resisting mediation should be strongly 
correlated with an increase in the likelihood of settlement. There are therefore good 
theoretical reasons to assume that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both 
the onset and outcome of mediation would be the same (see, Sartori 2003; Clayton 
2013).  As a result the Sartori model is a more appropriate choice. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in the onset analysis is taken from the CWM dataset, 
and indicates whether mediation began in a conflict year. Mediation onset occurred in 
236 of the 1,520 conflict years (15%). The dependent variable in the outcome analysis 
is binary success measure based on whether the CWM dataset defines a mediation 
episode as achieving either a partial or full settlement. Of the 180 conflict years in 
which mediation was initiated, 78 produced a settlement (43%).10 This method does 
not provide a comprehensive evaluation of mediation outcomes. For example, a peace 
                                                
10 In those years in which more than one process occurred the most successful outcome was selected.  
 16 
agreement is not always implemented and can often fail to prevent the continuation of 
violence in the future. However, both partial and full settlements signify notable 
achievements for a mediator, and offer an indication of the belligerents desire to move 
towards peace. As such it represents a valid indicator of one important element of 
mediator success (see, DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011; Touval and 
Zartman, 1985).  
 
Independent Variables 
To capture the presence of non-lootable resources I draw on a number of 
indicators. First, I include a binary variable from PETRODATA that indicates the 
presence of onshore oil production within a state (Lujala, R¿d, and Thieme 2007). 
Second, to capture the (relative) size of a states oil wealth I include an indicator of oil 
and gas income per capita (Ross 2012). Finally, to undertake a more convincing 
evaluation of competing mechanisms I also include binary measures of gas 
production, offshore oil production, and a spatially coded variable indicating when the 
conflict zone and oil producing territory overlap. Disaggregating resource indicators 
and using spatially coded resource variables facilitates a more convincing evaluation 
of competing mechanisms (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore 2005; Buhaug, Gates, 
Lujala 2009; Lujala 2010). For when there is a temporal and spatial overlap of 
resources and conflict it is more plausible that insurgents are also benefiting from 
resource revenue. Conversely, the production of gas and off-shore oil requires the 
greatest level of technological sophistication and is therefore most likely to be 




I include a number of control variables to account for other factors that might 
influence belligerentÕs incentives to agree to mediation and settlement. First, I include 
a measure of conflict intensity to account for incumbentÕs greater willingness to 
consider mediated settlement in costly conflicts (Clayton 2013). The intensity 
indicator is a dummy variable recording if a conflict crosses the 1,000 deaths per year 
threshold (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). Second, I include a measure of conflict 
duration indicating the number of years since conflict onset (Kreutz 2010). Long 
conflicts are more likely to involve weak insurgencies that are less likely to compel 
the state to accept mediation (Svensson 2007). Thirdly I include a binary measure 
capturing the existence of parallel conflicts within a state (Kreutz 2010). Multiple 
insurgencies increase the states costs for mediation and settlement, as rewarding one 
insurgency can motivate other challengers to intensify their efforts (Cunningham 
2006; Walter 2002). I also consider if a conflict occurred after 1989, since post-Cold 
War conflicts are more likely to be mediated and end peacefully (DeRouen, 
Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011). I include a variable indicating if the conflict was 
fought over a territorial incompatibility where groups seek autonomy or secession 
rather than control over the central state institutions (Kreutz 2010). Territorial 
incompatibilities are more likely to be focused within a specific region in which the 
insurgents can more effectively rival the incumbent. Even if an insurgent is clearly 
weak in relation to the state as a whole, they are more likely match the state within the 
specific conflict zone. As a result territorial conflicts are more likely to see mediation 
and settlement (Clayton 2013). I also include the lagged polity score for the 
incumbent (Gleditsch 2008). Democracies are expected to be more resistant to 
mediation but more effective once within the process (Mitchell 2002). Finally I 
include a measure of conflict management history indicating if mediation occurred 
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within the conflict in the previous year.11 Past conflict management efforts increase 
the likelihood of future mediation and success (Melin 2011). For descriptive statistics 
on all variables see online appendix A.  




The statistical results are presented on table I. Models 1 tests the effect of 
onshore oil production. Model 2 assesses petroleum revenue per capita. Model 3 
focuses on offshore oil production. Model 4 includes the indicator of gas production. 
Finally Model 5 tests the impact of the spatially coded oil production variable. In all 
models the selection (mediation onset) results are displayed in the left-hand column, 
and the outcome results in the right-hand column.  
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the presence of non-lootable resources would 
reduce the likelihood of mediation. It was argued that the process of resource 
extraction would favour state exploitation. Therefore states containing non-lootable 
resources should have a greater relative strength and be less prone to accept 
mediation. Descriptive analysis supports this argument. Onshore oil-producing states 
were faced with a rebellion of at least equal strength in only 6% of civil conflict years 
(49 of 832 conflict years). In comparison, governments without access to oil revenues 
faced evenly matched insurgents in 20% of conflict years (154 of 758 conflict years). 
Oil-producing states entered mediation in only 6% of conflict years (50 of 811 
conflict years), whilst the non-oil producers entered mediation in more than 22% 
cases (162 of 729 conflict years). In total non-oil producers entered into mediation in 
almost three times as many conflict years, despite oil producing states being involved 
                                                
11 I exclude mediation extending for more than one year.  
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in 179 additional years of violence. Hence despite the increased opportunity for third 
party assistance, mediation is less common within oil producing states.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------- 
 
To statistically assess this descriptive finding we turn to table I.  Model 1 
includes an indicator of on-shore oil production. The resource indicator shows a 
strong negative coefficient, suggesting that, as predicted, oil production significantly 
lowers the likelihood of mediation (p<0.01). The indicator of hydrocarbon revenue 
per capita (model 2) is also negative and significant, supporting the claim that the 
likelihood of mediation declines as oil revenues increases. As the coefficients 
generated by the Sartori selection model cannot be directly interpreted, I calculate the 
marginal effect of the oil indicator. Marginal effects report the expected change in the 
dependent variable as a function of a change in the independent variable (when all 
other covariates are held at the mean or modal values). The results show that in the oil 
production (in the post-cold war era) reduces the likelihood of mediation by 15%. 
This effect increases relative to state oil revenue. For example, in the post cold war 
era increasing the mean oil revenue (i.e. $126) by one standard deviation (i.e. $856) 
reduces the likelihood of mediation by 18%.12 This is strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis 1a and 1b.  
Hypothesis 2a predicted that mediation is less effective within oil producing 
states. It was argued that the stronger relative position of the incumbent and increased 
propensity for corruption and autocracy increased the scale of the commitment 
                                                
12 In case terms this is the difference between Indonesia in 1990 and Senegal in 1995.  
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problem. These same features were paradoxically argued to reduce the probability of 
commitment enhancing concessions, lowering the likelihood of settlement. The 
analysis supports this argument. On average oil producing states scored four points 
lower on the polity scale, reflecting their greater propensity for autocratic tendencies. 
Furthermore mediation produced an agreement within only 20% of episodes 
involving an oil producing state (10 of 50 mediation episodes), but successfully 
produced an agreement in 43% of mediation episodes in non-oil-producing states (69 
of 162 mediation episodes).   
The statistical analysis reported in the right hand column of models 1 and 2 
provide further support for the hypothesis. As predicted the presence of oil production 
shows a negative sign and is statistically significant. Similarly, greater oil revenue 
produces a more significant decline in the likelihood of mediation securing an 
agreement (model 2). The marginal effects suggest that oil production within a state 
lowers the likelihood of settlement (conditional on mediation occurring) by 12%. The 
size of the oil revenue again has a notable effect, with an increase of one standard 
deviation producing an 11% reduction in the likelihood of settlement.  
 
Rival Explanations 
Taken together the statistical analysis offers strong support for the hypotheses. 
However, it remains unclear which mechanism is driving this statistical result. For 
example, oil wealth might impact mediation by shaping rebel rather than incumbent 
capacity. Insurgents can also benefit from the theft and sale of resources, and might 
be motivated to resist settlement when tempted by the potential to gain greater control 
of resource wealth. In order to assess this competing mechanism I reran the estimates 
replacing the indicator of onshore oil production with variables capturing the 
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existence of gas production (Model 3), offshore oil production (Model 4), and a 
spatially coded variable that indicates the presence of oil in the conflict zone (Model 
5). In comparison to oil, it is far more challenging for insurgents to profit from gas 
reserves and offshore oil supplies, given the greater level of technological 
sophistication and organizational control required to extract the resources. The effect 
of these variables can therefore more confidently be attributed to the impact upon the 
incumbent. If these variables produce an effect that is consistent with the prior 
analysis, this is strong support for the argument that resources impact mediation 
through their effect on the strength of the state. On the other hand, oil production 
within the conflict zone is far more vulnerable to insurgent looting. We would also 
expect insurgents demanding a greater share of resources to be located in close 
proximity to oil rich land. If the effect of oil on mediation occurs through its effect on 
insurgents we would expect this variable to show a significant negative sign. 
However, the presence of oil within a conflict zone would likely reduce the stateÕs 
ability to profit from the resources. Therefore the relative strength argument would 
predict a more limited effect when oil is located within an area under dispute.  
The results provide strong support for the relative strength argument. Both 
offshore oil and gas production have a strong and statistically significant negative 
effect on mediation onset and outcome. This suggests that the negative effect of non-
lootable resources is largely driven by the increase it produces in state capacity. The 
spatially coded oil variable also produces a negative sign, but the effect is small and 
outside of the conventional levels of significance. This again supports the argument 




The control variables perform generally as expected and produce results that 
are broadly consistent with the prior theoretical discussion. Conflict intensity has a 
consistently positive (but not significant) effect. The existence of multiple conflicts 
significantly reduces the likelihood of mediation being accepted and producing an 
agreement. Conflicts taking place after 1989 are more likely to be successfully 
mediated. Previous mediation attempts increase the likelihood of future mediation and 
the probability of settlement. Surprisingly conflict duration and the type of 
government within a state have no significant effect on either the selection or outcome 
of mediation.  Finally, territorial incompatibilities are shown to be more likely to be 
mediated and to terminate through a peace agreement.  This result is perhaps 
surprising given that resource-funded rebellions should be more likely to be located in 
the state periphery, and often desire some form of secession. However, while rebels 
might be in a position of weakness in relation to the state force, in the small peripheral 
area they are more likely to match the armed potential of the state. Therefore groups 
fighting over territorial incompatibilities appear to have a greater ability to project 
sufficient force against states that they opt to accept a mediator and eventually agree 
some solution.  
 
Robustness Checks  
To ensure that the results are born of stable structural relationships I changed a 
number of the model specifications and re-ran the estimates. Firstly, research has 
shown that the inclusion of too many controls can increase the bias within statistical 
results (Clark 2005). I therefore reran all models without controls. In each case the 
results remain consistent. 
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Secondly, to ensure that I am not guilty of omitting any other key variables, I 
rerun the analysis including a number of additional controls that previous research 
suggests might influence the dynamics of civil war mediation.  I include a measure of 
GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2008), relative rebel strength (Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
Salehyan, 2009), coup dÕtats and internationalised civil wars (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
The key findings remain robust in all alternative specifications.  State strength has a 
positive effect in all models, offering further evidence to suggest that conflicts 
involving strong states are the least likely to see mediation and settlement. In line with 
previous research, coups and non-internationalised civil wars are significantly less 
likely to be mediated.  
Thirdly, dividing conflict episodes into conflict years increases the likelihood 
of a small selection of oil-rich conflicts biasing the statistical results. To ensure that 
this is not the case I exclude the ten states that produce the highest frequency of 
conflict years.13 As expected this marginally reduces the size of the coefficients, 
however the results remain strong and statistically significant.  
Fourthly, valuable natural resources often occur in close proximity to each 
other. For example, of the 194 conflict episodes in which hydrocarbons were present 
within a state, 94 also contained lucrative gemstones (48%). To ensure that the effect 
of hydrocarbons on mediation is not a spurious relationship driven by the presence of 
other resources, I reran the estimates controlling for the presence of secondary 
diamonds, gemstones and narcotic production (both within the state and within the 
conflict zone) (Lujala, R¿d, and Thieme 2007; Flter, Lujala and R¿d 2007).14  In 
each case the effect of oil production remained robust. Each of the other resources 
                                                
13 The states that produced the highest frequency of conflict years are: Myanmar, India, Ethiopia, 
Philippines, Israel, Chad, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia, and Colombia. 
14 The presence of lootable resources has been shown to influence the likelihood of more robust forms 
of third-party intervention, see Findley and Marineau 2014.  
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also exerted a generally negative effect on mediation. However, the effects were weak 
and inconsistent and rarely achieved statistical significance. This probably reflects the 
more varied effects of lootable resources. Whilst oil production almost always 
provides the incumbent with an economic advantage, lootable resources can benefit 
both belligerents. The influence on insurgents is varied, whilst access to resources can 
sometimes lead to strong and well-armed rebellions (e.g. NPLF and RUF), on other 
occasions they can facilitate the formation of relatively weak insurgents prone to 
infighting and splintering that would otherwise have been unable to overcome the 
problem of collective action (e.g. FLEC and KNU) (Weinstein 2006; Le Billion 
2012). Thus whilst hydrocarbons commonly increase the relative position of the state 
and reduce the likelihood and effectiveness of conflict management, lootable 
resources have a varied effect upon the distribution of belligerent power and a less 
consistent effect on resolution attempts.  
Finally, to this point mediation success has been equated with the creation of a 
partial or full settlement. This indicator measures only the immediate effects of 
mediation, failing to capture elements of sustainability that we might intuitively 
associate with successful conflict management. This is particularly pertinent in civil 
conflict in which many mediated agreements are short-lived. To better model the 
impact that non-lootable resources have upon the mid-to-long term success of 
mediation, I reran the models using the conflict episode as the unit of analysis. In this 
case the dependent variable in the onset phase of the model is a dichotomous indicator 
coding whether mediation occurred within a whole conflict episode. In total 
mediation takes place in 79 of the 290 conflict episodes. The dependent variable in 
the outcome analysis is a dichotomous variable recording the type of termination 
within each episode (Kreutz 2010). All mediated conflicts that were terminated by a 
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settlement (full, partial or process) or ceasefire are coded as a success, whilst 
mediated conflicts that terminate through military victory, the merging of rebel 
groups, or low activity, are considered unsuccessful. By measuring mediation success 
in this manner, better account is taken of the full range of agreements that can 
terminate violence, and the long-term effects of mediation. A process is only 
considered a success when a mediator produces an agreement that terminates a violent 
conflict for at least one year.15 According to this method of operationalization, 39 
conflict episodes that welcomed a mediator resulted in a positive outcome (49%).  
The results offer additional confirmation of the previous findings (see, online 
appendix b for full tables). Oil Production reduces the likelihood of mediation (within 
a conflict episode) by 25%. Similarly oil production produces a 16% decline in the 
probability of a conflict terminating through a mediated agreement. The negative 
effect of petroleum on both the onset and outcome of mediation is again shown to 
increase relative to oil wealth (per capita).  
Conclusions 
This article illustrates the effect that hydrocarbons have on the initiation and outcome 
of mediation.  Existing literature offers many mechanisms linking natural resources to 
the onset and duration of civil conflict (see Koubi et al. 2014) but regrettably has 
overlooked the influence that resources have on conflict management. This study has 
shown that non-lootable natural resources influence the bargaining process in civil 
war. Oil revenue creates a greater power asymmetry that reduces the frequency and 
effectiveness of mediation. This finding complements recent work that has stressed 
the increased duration of conflicts fought within oil producing states (Lujala 2010). 
                                                
15 This approach does not capture those cases in which violence restarts after more than one year, as in 
this case the conflict would be coded as a new conflict episode.  
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Previously this has been attributed to the effect that oil has on rebel movements, yet 
the results of this study suggest that the greater capacity of oil-producing states also 
lowers the likelihood of peaceful resolution.  
These findings have relevance to the policy community, in particular those 
attempting to resolve disputes in oil producing states.  The results suggest that third 
parties could increase the frequency of mediation by reducing the power asymmetry 
produced by oil revenue. One way in which this might be achieved is through trade 
embargos that lower the oil revenue available to incumbents. In principle a restriction 
on the sale of hydrocarbons would reduce the capacity of the state and increase their 
openness to mediation. However, this approach is unlikely to prevent the onset and 
reoccurrence of oil-funded war. Moreover, it could motivate non-state groups to 
bargain harder and fight longer in the hope that the international community will act 
to bolster their bargaining position. Instead a more fruitful approach would be policies 
focused upon promoting good governance in oil-producing states. An increase in the 
accountability and transparency of oil-rich incumbents would reduce issues of 
asymmetric information and lower rebel fears of defection. This should improve the 
effectiveness of mediation and potentially reduce the duration of resource-based war.  
Understanding the obstacles that block the resolution of civil war is essential. 
Effective conflict management can only occur when we understand the dynamics 
shaping the resolution process. This study represents the first empirical assessment of 
the impact that resources have on conflict resolution. The use of disaggregated 
resource variables facilitated the assessment of competing mechanisms. In this way 
the study represents an important attempt to forge a better connection between 
methodological developments within civil war research and the growing literature 
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focused on conflict management. The results suggest that this is an effective approach 
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